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raise a rebuttable presumption that the legal meaning was intended, rather than the
irrebuttable presumption employed by the classical rule, or the apparent lack of any
presumption under the liberal rule. Cf. 94 A. L. R. 226 (1935). The burden of introducing evidence and of proving by a preponderance of such evidence that the words
were meant in other than the normal sense should be on the party denying the normal
meaning. Such a presumption would do much to eliminate the possibility of successful
fraudulent claims, which the liberal rule with no presumption would allow. Although
application of a rebuttable presumption in the principal case would not have changed
the result, since the surrounding circumstances showed conclusively that the recipient
of the insurance money was the only person considered by the contracting parties,
the court's adoption of the extreme liberal view seems unnecessary.

Corporate Reorganization-Constitutional Rights of Dissenting Classes under
§ 77B(b)(5)-[Federal].-In a reorganization proceeding under § 77 B of the Bankruptcy Act, the debtor proposed various plans which were rejected by the bondholders
as a class. The final plan, vague in terms, proposed to scale the bondholders' claims
down twenty per cent, giving in exchange new bonds secured by a mortgage on the
property formerly encumbered, or in the alternative, to appraise the value of dissenting bondholders' interests and pay them in cash. The debtor, anticipating refusal of
the bondholders to accept the plan, relied on § 77B (b)(5) which provides for the
adoption of a plan that has not received the required assents of creditors. From a final
order dismissing the plan and proceedings, the debtor appealed. Held, decree affirmed;
§ 77B (b) (5) is unconstitutional. In re Tennessee PublishingCo., 81 F. (2d) 463 (C.C.A.
6th 1936).
Section 77B (b) provides that a plan of reorganization'".... (5) shall provide in
respect of each class of creditors of which less than two-thirds in amount shall accept
such plan .... adequate protection for the realization by them of the value of their
interests claims, or liens .... either as provided in the plan (a) by the transfer or sale
of such property subject to such interests .... or (b) by a sale free of such interests,
claims or liens at not less than a fair upset price and the transfer of such nterests,
claims or liens to the proceeds of such sale; or (c) by appraisal and payment .... in
or (d) by such method as
of such interests, claims or liens ....
cash of the value....
will in the opinion of the judge, under and consistent with the circumstances of the
particular case, equitably and fairly provide such protection ...... " 48 Stat. 94
(1934), i U. S. C. A. § 207 (b) (supp. 1935).
This section, in terms, seems to apply to all reorganizations, whether the group actively reorganizing represents senior creditors, junior creditors, or stockholders. In
cases where senior creditors employ the section to force a plan on junior classes, clauses
(a) and (b) are probably constitutional as they provide for the junior classes all to
which they were originally entitled. However, clause (c) is probably unconstitutional
if used to cut out a junior class which has a likelihood of realizing upon its claims in the
event of foreclosure of the senior lien. Louisville Land Bank v. Radford (295 U.S. 555
(1935)) strongly suggests that the payment of the appraised value of a security interest is not an adequate substitute for the creditor's ordinary remedies, although the
Frazier-Lemke Act, held unconstitutional in that case, was more drastic than section
77B (b) (5) (c) in giving the debtor six years in which to pay most of the appraised val-
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ue. But the Radford case is not authority where the technical right of the junior class
to foreclose is worthless because a forced sale would leave nothing for it, even though
there may be value behind the junior claims on a going concern basis. The application
of clause (c) here would seem not to violate the due process clause because cash is
given in exchange for the valueless technical right to foreclose.
It was probably intended that the application of § 77B (b) (5) be restricted to reorganizations by senior creditors. However, junior classes of creditors and stockholders
have, as in the instant case, attempted unsuccessfully to employ the section to force a
plan upon non-assenting senior classes. In reMurel Holding Co., 75 F. (2d) 941 (C.C.A.
2d 1935); In re Preble Corp., 12 F. Supp. 1002 (Me. 1935); FranciscoBldg. Corp., Ltd.
v. Battson, C.C.H. Bankr. Serv., par. 3925 (C.C.A. 9th, Mar. 17, 1936). Here again the
constitutionality of clauses (a) and (b) is probably beyond question. But the junior
classes would seem to be taking an inconsistent position by invoking clause (c). An
appraisal of the value of the senior classes' interest at less than ioo per cent amounts
to an admission that the value of the property reorganized is not sufficient to cover
those primary claims. Thus it leaves the junior classes with no interest or equity to
reorganize. In re Continental Cigar Co., C.C.H. Bankr. Serv., par. 3652 (D.C. Pa.,
Oct. 30, 1935); In re William Penn Garage, C.C.H. Bankr. Serv., par. 3649 (D.C. Pa.,
Oct. 7, 1935); Inre Consolidation Coal Co., ii F. Supp. 594 (D.C. Md. 1935). And if
the junior classes claim an equity or interest over and above senior claims, a fair plan
"to adequately protect" the senior claims should allow them full payment in cash.
In re Murel Holding Co., 75 F. (2d) 941 (C.C.A. 2d i935); In re Preble Corp., 12 F.
Supp. 1002 (Me. 1935); FranciscoBldg. Corp., Ltd. v. Battson, C.C.H. Bankr. Serv.,
par. 3925 (C.C.A. 9th, Mar. 17, 1936). The probable expense of doing so would prohibit such reorganizations. And if a plan were considered fair which provided for appraisal and payment of less than the full amount of the senior claims, clause (c) of subsection (b) (5), as so applied, would clearly be unconstitutional. Cf. Louisville Land
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
Since clauses (a), (b), and (c) provide methods for cutting out dissenting classes entirely and paying them off, or allowing them to maintain their position, a plan such as
that proposed in the present case which seeks to force a class to come into the plan and
accept new securities even though more than one-third of the class have rejected the
plan, must fall if anywhere within clause (d). If any scaling down of the senior claims
is provided by a plan presented by junior groups under clause (d), then that clause
would, afortiori,be unconstitutional as being more drastic in effect than payment in
cashunder clause (c). See InreM-urel Holding Co., 75 F. (2d) 941 (C.C.A. 2d 1935);
FraniscoBldg. Corp., Ltd. v. Battson, C.C.H. Bankr. Serv., par. 3925 (C.C.A. 9th,
Mar. 17, 1936). And even if no scaling is attempted, clause (d) would, perhaps, be unconstitutional in the light of that part of the Radfordopinion which criticized the delay
of the right to foreclose in the absence of emergencies. Louisville Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 598 (I935). Section 77B is permanent rather than emergency legislation. See 15 B. U. L. Rev. 818 (1935).

Corporate Reorganization-Suit against a Solvent Surety when the Principal Is
Being Reorganized under § 77B-[Federal].-The dissenting bondholders of a corporation in reorganization under § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act (48 Stat. 912 (1934), ii

